The "Estadão" of the day 11/10 publishes a long article on its international page on the issue of relations between the Continent and the Island, namely between Beijing and Taipei.
Citing the New York Times as sources, Washington Post and Agence France Presse (sic), the newspaper reports that “in yet another move to deteriorate the relationship between China and Taiwan, the leaders of the country and the island exchanged accusations and threats about the unification of the territory, considered by Beijing as one of its provinces.. On the weekend of the 110th anniversary of the Revolution of 1911, tension in the Taiwan Strait only increases, after the largest incursion by Chinese military aircraft into the island's air defense identification zone”.
On the same page, the newspaper replicates an article from “The Economist” entitled “Xi Jinping expands threats to the island”. The text states that "it was a deliberate provocation, patriotically programmed. On October 1st, national day of the country, China launched 38 aircraft, including fighters and bombers, towards Taiwan. Aircraft entered the Airspace Identification Zone (Ziea) of the island, a buffer region where intrusions often trigger military alerts… Over the next three days, China sent others 111 planes. In response, Taiwan launched jets, made warning notices and tracked Chinese aircraft with missile systems. The island's defense minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, described the event as "the most difficult situation I faced in more than 40 years of my military life".
Sensational alarmism, or real threat?
let us resort to history. allow, however, the friends that I give my personal testimony in this regard. Justify-me, I believe, the fact that I have served in both posts throughout my career, longer time at the Embassy in Beijing and shorter time and later (but twice), at the "Brazilian Commercial Office in Taipei", formula found by the Brazilian government to maintain relations with the island when in 1974 we transfer our diplomatic recognition to the Continent.
Was 08 June 1995, when I served in Beijing, that the then President (with, or without "quotes") de Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui began his “historic visit” – as the Taiwanese call it – to the United States, with the objective – formal – to give a lecture at Cornell University, your "Alma Mater". this visit, the first of a Taiwanese agent, although classified as "private", it caused an exacerbated reaction from the authorities in Beijing (e, as "bonus", great embarrassment for then-president Bill Clinton). In this ocasion, Lee said his “country was ready and willing to take on more responsibility to help solve the world's problems, and that China and Taiwan needed to cooperate in finding a way to peacefully meet" (sic). This visit was followed by a second, in March 1996, on the eve of presidential elections in Taiwan.
it was pandemonium! The Chinese Communist Party's summit threatened to mobilize the People's Liberation Army to curb the "libertarian rapes of the rebel Island"; and the ELP performed on two occasions, intimidating maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait. China's unity has become an obsessive topic in the diplomatic community's conversations in Beijing. We wondered if it hadn't elapsed, So, ten years of Tian An Men's convulsions, the Chinese leadership would be willing to again defy world public opinion to contain what it perceived to be a threat to China's unity.
This yielded my thesis in the High Studies Course/CAE at Itamaraty, titled “China and Taiwan, Scenarios for Brazilian Diplomacy". In it I distinguished three scenarios: 1) the confrontation; 2) the deal; e 3) the emergence of a consensual status quo, corollary of the second hypothesis. This is because I sensed that the alarmist rhetoric did not fit the dimension – international, including - the consequences that a real confrontation could trigger.
To qualify the dispute, by the way, already in 1988 the Beijing government had established the "Taiwan Affairs Bureau", which is still responsible today for the definition and implementation of guidelines and policies related to Taiwan, under the direction of the PRC State Council. Taiwan did the same: created the “Straits Exchange Foundation” (head), nominally non-governmental institution, but led directly by the Continental Affairs Council., an instrument of the Executive Yuan, that is, by the government itself. That is, both sides have direct formal channels to settle their disputes., and this since 1988…but…
In my wanderings around Taiwan, in 2009/10, I asked people of all ages what their feelings were about what Deng Xiaoping thought was the “unfinished heritage” of shared history.. He claimed that this issue should have been resolved by Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek right from the start.. the political hiatus, according to him, sharpened over time, to the point of making it insoluble by "normal" means. that's what's happening, how could i verify. The more time passes, the more the two societies grow apart, and as they share less and less common history and destiny, less the Taiwanese identify with the values of the Continent, especially the younger generations, that they had no contact with the continental ones and about which they harbor enormous prejudices. So much so that I received different responses from people: the older ones – especially those nostalgic for the expatriate “Kuomintang” – still felt somehow connected to the “common homeland”; the youngest, However, claimed to be ancestrally part of Chinese civilization, but with absolutely different history and contemporary values.
However, if we research the economic and trade relations between the two sides of the Strait, we will be surprised to find that Taiwan is, currently, one of the biggest investors on the continent. Between 1991 and the end of March 2020, these investments referred to 44.056 operations, totaling US$ 188,5 billion. In 2019, the value of intra-narrow trade was US$ 149,2 billion. Taiwan's GDP growth in 2020 was mainly supported by the increase in the trade surplus and internal investment. And Taiwanese exports reached the record percentage of 4,9% in 2020, com a China (Hong Kong, inclusive) accounting for about 44% from them, an increase of 12% about 2019. This makes the mainland the island's main trading partner and the key factor in this trade surplus!
Dilemma? At the same time “Ilha Rebelde” and the biggest commercial partner? The saying “enemies…enemies…business apart?” oriental wisdom, that the West does not understand and see “giants in windmills”?…
in this spirit, it would be these recent aerial exercises off the Taiwan Straits, in celebrations of the 110th anniversary of the Revolution of 1911 – common ephemeris that celebrates the end of a disastrous period in Chinese history, a queda da dinastia Qing, responsible for the tragic moments of the two Opium Wars and the "Century of Humiliations" – one more "formula" to show the "Rebel Island", like what happened in 1995, who has the power, especially at this moment that the “Democratic Progressive Party” (DPP), currently in government, has a "separatist" slant?…We know, sovereign, that China's unity is an unshakeable pillar of her concept of her – the word seems correct to me – civilization. And this is non-negotiable, I have absolute conviction.
Faced with this dilemma - or challenge – many in Taiwan argue that economic and trade dependence on the Mainland indicates that the approach of keeping Beijing at bay while the Island seeks a closer alliance with the United States in the face of President Xi Jinping's assertiveness is just rhetoric, as the Island, after all, depends on the continent for its prosperity. In this context, will the manifestation of President Tsai Ing-wen, that "no one would force the Taiwanese population to bow to Chinese pressure" could even reach a more bellicose stage? E, in this case, will the United States, that by the "Taiwan Relations Act", of 1979, pledged to Taiwan's safety and security, would risk raising tensions to such a level, with imaginable and dire regional and global consequences?
There are multiple variables in this equation. So, I go back to my 1995 finding.… What is at stake is too dangerous for everyone. Alliances and external pressures will not resolve a legacy that, At my point of view, it will only be shared when the two heirs arrive at a condominium of power, maybe in a confederate formula. deng was right…and oriental patience is elastic…would be the remaining "scene game"?
I suggest that friends read the article below:
