In 15 last january, during his annual speech to the nation Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his desire to reform the Russian political system through a constitutional amendment. Soon after his speech Putin received from the hands of his Prime Minister, Dmitri Medvedev, his resignation and his entire cabinet of ministers.
Hours later Putin was back on the news presenting his new prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin, former head of the Russian federal revenue, while its predecessor, Medvedev, was appointed to the post of deputy head of the national security council. These three events in the same day demonstrated something unusual for the Putin government's decisions: hurry. Just five days later, in day 20 of January, Putin rose to the Duma, the russian lower legislative chamber, the proposed constitutional reform, finally revealing concrete details of the proposed reorganization of the Russian political system. In day 21 the new prime minister announced his cabinet of ministers, keeping Chancellor Segey Lavrov, and the ministers of finance and defense, Anton Siluanov and Sergei Shoigu respectively. The other ministries certainly entered the negotiations with allied political parties in the search for Putin for votes for the approval of his constitutional reform in parliament.. Political analysts in Russia and around the world were stunned by the sequence of events and wonder: what will this constitutional reform bring and why so much urgency in having it passed?
In an address to the nation on the day 15, Putin indicated that the reform proposal would reduce the attributions of the president in favor of the first minister. Another aspect briefly announced was the creation of the position of president of the Council of State who would also assume power designations executive being responsible for the internal policy strategy, outside and of economic development. With the preliminary indications on the reform constitutional law, many analysts anticipated the facts, predicting that Putin was preparing the field for its perpetuation of power in Russia. The following reasoning was that Putin was preparing alternatives so that he could remain in power after the end of the current and last presidential term in 2024. Analysts argue that Putin could come to occupy the position of a strengthened prime minister or president in the reformed State Council. It wouldn't be the first time he'd made a maneuver to keep the reins of power in the hands.
Elect a successor or reform the constitution: that is the question.
In 2008 Putin ends his second term as president without support legal to dispute the third. The strategy adopted to remain in power was to support the candidacy of his faithful ally Dmitri Medvedev for the post of presidency, what turned out to be a good choice. During the presidency of Medvedev, between 2008 e 2012, Putin took over as prime minister, period that became known as the government in tandem – or four-handed government. four years later, as it was or muscovite model, again in conditions of run for president, has taken over from his ally's hands. However, during Medvedev's presidency, Russia has gone through unexpected and great difficulties in the first six months of government – the global financial crisis in 2008 and the Russo-Georgian War in South Ossetia. There was also disagreements between the two leaders regarding the security council of the United Nations and foreign trade policy – it was with Medvedev that Russia was finally accepted as a member country of the World Trade Organization (OMC).
Russian independent journalist Anastasia Kirlenko revealed recently that Putin's choice to support Medvedev's candidacy in 2008 The presidency surprised some of its allies: leaders of a well-known faction st petersburg criminal, a Tambovskaya Bratva – ou Irmandade Tambov em português, crime group organized. Kirlenko published wiretaps made by the Spanish police in 2007 with communications telephone exchanges between members of the Tambov Brotherhood operating in Spain who were surprised by Medvedev's choice of candidacy and that they regretted that Putin would not have opted to assume the post of President of the Council of State in Russia[i]. It would not be at all surprising that Putin, today with 63 years, look for alternatives instead of electing a successor and waiting for a presidential term to return to resume the presidency through the polls.
What is Putin's goal with reform??
Once the text of 29 pages with the proposal for constitutional reform was known in 20 January, doubts began to hover among politicians in the opposition, journalists and political analysts. In the text presented to the congress it is unclear what exactly Putin seeks with the reform. There are few changes in the attributions of power of the president of the republic and of the prime minister and the post of president of the Council of State is subject to the President. In the midst of so many uncertainties, a modification as to the limitation of the number of presidency terms brought new interpretations about what Putin might be looking for. The current constitution restricts to three terms consecutive presidential. It is speculated that with the proposed modification, limited to two consecutive terms, Putin could come to dispute more two elections, as the count of the number of mandates would begin to from the approval of the constitutional amendment and would not be retroactive. In case if confirm this interpretation of eligibility for two other presidential terms six years old, Putin could remain president of Russia until the 84 years of age. It is worth remembering that in March 2018 the Chinese Communist Party decided eliminate any restrictions on term of office to favor continuity in power of current Chinese President Xi Jinping indefinitely – would Putin be emulating its rival to the east?
The reform is not limited to the balances of power between the heads of the executive and legislative and the new figure of president of the Council of State, it brings two other very important aspects. The proposed reform limits the legal scope of international treaties that could no longer override the stipulated by the national constitution. Another aspect deals with the national economy with the indexation of the minimum wage and pensions to inflation. Even if there is no agreement on how exactly constitutional reform will favor Putin's future and conservation of your power, There are two consensuses on the same, the first: the approval is dealt with urgently and with great haste by the government and its congressional base; O The second point of consensus among analysts is related to the understanding that Putin prepares the political and legal field so that he can move away from presidency without giving up all power.
In this last scenario, the doubt between journalists and specialists is about the kind of departure from the presidency Putin would be planning. Two possibilities: the first would be that, in an unusual way in their practices, inhabit, Putin would be planning far in advance the end of his term in 2024; the second would be that Putin was about to resign from the presidency of similar manner to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev.
After 29 years ahead of Kazakhstan's presidency, Nazarbaev resigned from the office, but remained head of the country's all-powerful Security Council and received the honorary title of Leader of the Nation. In 22 March 2019, just three days after Nazarbaev's resignation, former Russian diplomat and international policy expert, Alexander Baunov, wrote an article in the magazine Foreign Policy in which he correctly predicted that Putin would likely seek to itself a Kazakh-style transition of power[ii]. Recently, with the announcement of Putin's constitutional reform, Baunov declared journalist Jamie Dettmer that Russia is experiencing, definitely, per a kind of transformation, abandoning the Western model of government for the neo-eastern model of government[iii].
The beginning of the end of the Putin era: eminence of risks.
There are legal reasons why Putin wants to reform the constitution Russia in order to safeguard its eventual departure from the presidency of the republic. O The New York Times political analyst Andrew Kramer went straight to the point that an eventual removal of the current Russian president from public life will bring serious risks to the stability of the country and to its own security.[iv] For both, the Russian Republic and Vladimir Putin, an eventual transition would bring two types of risks: disputes over power and the daring of lawfare. THE Russian politics is formed by an intricate network of power constituted by oligarchs, Military and intelligence officers and politicians. the power struggle in the country employs a practice, already almost cultural, of espionage and blackmail known as kompromat (game of Russian words for compromising material), slang created during the Stalinism (1922-1953) by KGB members (abbreviation for Russian secret service Committee state Security or committee of state security in Portuguese) for refer to dossiers against opponents. Kramer points out that there are currently fierce internal power struggles in Russia and cites as an example a recent and fierce dispute between the ex-minister of the economy, o liberal Aleksei Ulyukayev, and the ultraconservative Igor Sechin, oil company chief executive Rosneft – third largest in the country – and considered one of the closest men to Vladimir Putin. the former minister was sentenced to eight years in prison after being accused by Sechin that would have requested and accepted a bribe for the approval of the acquisition of a company oil company by Rosneft.
as it was or muscovite model, you are not able from 1999, amassed allies, disaffected and enemies and will certainly not be unharmed if he withdraws from public life. In case it comes leave exercise and power permanently, Putin and His Currents allies inside and outside the government will be at serious risk of being arrested. Putin seems to want to strengthen the system of checks and balances between the three powers of the republic as a way of guarding against one of its main strategies for fighting opponents: The lawfare.
law war: fear inside and outside Russia.
The term lawfare refers to English word combination warfare (war practices) e law (lei), being therefore understood as a battle by legal means. The use of laws confrontational purposes is based on the abuse and manipulation of existing laws as effective weapons for achieving an operational objective. Historically the term was used to describe complex legal battles in civil law or in international relations. However, from the first decade of the 21st century the term has become a military and national security concept. In 2001, the then US Air Force Colonel Charles Dunlop Jr., today retired general and director of the ethics center, law and national security in the prestigious Duke University in North Carolina, USA, published an article about the war of Kosovo in which he hypothesizes that in an increasingly globalized the practice of warfare would become even more asymmetrical or unequal for the use and abuse of laws and courts[v].
In recent years the practice of lawfare increasingly common in disputes between nations, so with the struggle between political groups. All current great powers – USA, China, Russia, Israel – using laws as efficient weapons in its conflicts. O American academic Mike Koehler, for example, proposes to thesis that with federal law Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) the US has a sophisticated instrument of lawfare against selected targets[we]. Arizona State University law professor Orde Kittrie, points the Chinese advances in the use of lawfare for defend your maritime interests, aerial, cyber and space[vii]. Putin's government is regarded by military officials around the world as one of the masters of hybrid warfare practices, particularly in the cross-border use of the lawfare[viii].
Many politicians around the world have declared themselves victims of lawfare. Recently the magazine American Jacobin published a interview with former Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa and French politician Jean-Luc Mélechon who claim to be victims of this type of practice in their countries[ix]. No brazil, the lawyers of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva have already raised the thesis that their client is also the target of this war strategy legal, even releasing a book on the term and practice of lawfare[x]. It would not be surprising that Putin became the target of a legal war International.
In the unlikely scenario that Putin retires from office entirely public, he would certainly become a defendant in numerous legal proceedings moved by their opponents in Russia and even indicted by the Court International Justice for war crimes committed during the conflict in Crimea. With the constitutional reform Putin would then have the conditions favorable conditions to defend oneself as an ordinary citizen against a possible and probable lawfare in Russia and abroad.
The new ministerial cabinet: dual mission
Putin wants to restart the economy as soon as possible to make sure his reform will be endorsed by the people. Fearing popular demonstrations headed by “discontented with globalization” – using the phrase coined almost 20 years for the Nobel Prize in economics Joseph Stiglitz – Putin leaves the fiscal discipline posture of its government and launches an investment package and government spending. According to a report published in the Financial Times of day 25 of January, the new premier Mikhail Mishustin will have at his disposal 128,5 billions of dollars from oil revenues and available in national sovereign to stimulate the Russian economy in addition to continuing the program investment and national development of 400 billions of dollars[xi]. Besides that, Mishutstin has the sympathy of the Russian business class for account of modernizations in the Russian federal revenue – such as the digitization of the tax system – promoted by him over the last decade. to reform Putin's ministerial, so it has a dual purpose: help in the approval of reform in the legislature and with the voters – once approved by the Chamber of deputies the constitutional reform must be approved by plebiscite - with the new economic package that will be released soon.
Nothing new under the sun, or over the snow.
Putin has been in power for 20 years and, therefore, has extensive experience in office, including a period when he had to step down from the presidency. be with perpetuation in power or with an honorary public position, the maneuvers and Putin's yearnings represent nothing new for political practices contemporary in the Orient. We are definitely going through a period of world political transition. New forms of government and state administration are starting to be implemented. These are signs of the decay of the model. post-war western politician.
The pillars of the post-war west, based on liberal democracy, at the
free trade and multilateralism, continue to lose space on the periphery of the
world.
[i] Anastasia Kirilenko, “Members of the Tambov organized criminal group discussed Putin”, The Insider, 15 in January 2020 https://theins.ru/politika/196470
[ii] Alexander Baunov, “Putin Wants a Kazakh Retirement”, Foreign Policy, 22 in March of 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/22/putin-wants-a-kazakh-retirement/
[iii] Jamie Detter, “Putin Denies He Wants to Remain in Power Indefinitely”, VOANews, 19 January 2020, https://www.voanews.com/europe/putin-denies-he-wants-remain-power-indefinitely
[iv] Andrew E. Kramer, “Putin and the Art of Stepping Down Gracefully While Keeping a Grip on Power”, The New York Times, 17 January 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/17/world/europe/russia-putin-state-council.html
[v] Charles Dunlap Jr. “Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts”, paper presented at the conference Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention, Washington, DC, in 29 November 2001, available in http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6193&context=faculty_scholarship
[we] Mike Koehler, “The Uncomfortable Truths and Double Standards of Bribery Enforcement”, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 84 (2) article 8, 2015, available in: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol84/iss2/8
[vii] Order Kittrie, “The Chinese Government Adopts and Implements a Lawfare Strategy” capítulo de Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War, 2016, published by Oxford Scholarship Online available in: https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190263577.001.0001/acprof-9780190263577-chapter-4
[viii] Mark Voyger, “Russian Lawfare – Russia’s Weaponisation Of International And Domestic Law: Implications For The Region And Policy Recommendations”, 2018, Journal on Baltic Security, vol.4 (2), available in: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330477790_Russian_Lawfare_-_Russia’s_Weaponisation_Of_International_And_Domestic_Law_Implications_For_The_Region_And_Policy_Recommendations
[ix] Denis Rogatyuk and Patrick Merry Bell, “Lawfare: The Technocrats’ War on Democracy” Interview such as Rafael Correa and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Jacobin, 20 September 2019, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/09/rafael-correa-jean-luc-melenchon-lawfare-ecaudor-france-insoumise
[x] Cristiano Zanin, Valeska Martins and Rafael Valim, Lawfare: an introduction, 2019, Are Paul: Countercurrent Publisher
[xi] Henry Foy e Max Seddon, “Vladimir Putin hands new PM mandate to begin spending spree”, The Financial Times, 25 January 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/e9c52440-3dc2-11ea-a01a-bae547046735
