The victory of Alberto FernĂĄndez and Cristina Kirchner in the presidential elections in Argentina represented a huge blow to the center-right movements in Latin America. Among the many journalistic articles in the local press and specialized international analyzes that have been circulating since the primary elections in Argentina - last August and which indicated an inevitable defeat by Macri - there is a consensus around the economic failure of his government, mainly due to the increase in inflation and public debt. [1] The fact that analysts link Macri's defeat to neoliberal economic policies sparks a warning to the current Brazilian government that relies on neoliberal radicalism as an economic policy.
The failure of Macri's economic neoliberalism occurred although it benefits from three aspects highlighted here: your trajectory policy, his family background and his relations with the international community. These points are important to make a comparison with the current government Brazilian who rejoices in his political network - albeit made up of novices and opportunists -, valuing family ties in national politics and international - such as the superficial friendship of one of the children with Trump family - and illusory alliances with foreign governments and investors. This article aims to bring to light the advantages that the Macri government possessed, in relation to the Brazilian, for the implementation of a neoliberal agenda: O Argentine had in fact an authentic, vast and organic network formed by public policy experts. His family owns an extensive conglomerate of companies and has good relations with local entrepreneurs and international. Macri received unprecedented recent support, in the region, gives international community - financial banking, multilateral institutions, heads of state and government. Even with all that, Macri failed to implement of your economic agenda and at the polls. Taking the Macri case as an example, it demonstrates the weakness that the current government in these three pillars.
Itâs the economy, stupid. The reasons for the defeat.
In article recent, Federico Sturzenegger - President of the Central Bank of Argentina of Macri government until June 2018 - maintains that âas a wholeâ its government was not bad, but recognizes that the electoral failure was due to economic policy.[2] Macri has indeed had some good results in several areas. In terms of public policy there have been statistical and institutional improvements: decrease in 30% homicide rates and appointment of independent judges for the Supreme Court Argentina. It also carried out important reforms in public management with expressive results in reducing costs in public administration, improved the national financial system and air infrastructure. Your management was also applauded for the decrease in restrictions on international trade: elimination of barriers to agricultural exports and export duties, end the lack of transparency in foreign trade procedures, end of exchange controls. However, throughout his four years in office there was a deterioration of important macroeconomic indicators: remains of 10% in income national per capita; the accumulated inflation in the four years was above 300%; The unemployment rate has surpassed the psychological double-digit barrier, passing from 7,5% more than 10% of unemployed; tripled the external debt and almost doubled the public debt. [3] Another renowned ex-minister of the economy and also presidential candidate, Roberto Lavagna, points to the fact that contrary to the promised policy economy chased away investors. To over the four years of Macri's government were withdrawn from the country almost 85 billion of dollars.[4] Such an economic failure was not expected because the government had at its side a excellent group of economists and support from the international financial system, what offered financing to implement its reforms. Macri too enjoyed close ties with the most important political leaders worldwide. So what was the reason for the failure?
In a country accustomed to almighty super economic ministers, Macri brought to his government two of them with enormous recognition inside and outside the country : Alfonso Prat-Gay, appointed Minister of Finance and Public Finance, studied at the University of Pennsylvania in the USA and enjoys international recognition for his outstanding stint in the 90 by JP Morgan of New York acting as director and market strategist and Prat-Gay who has already had a successful role as president of the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic between 2002 e 2004. Another prominent international name on Macri's team was the one nominated for the presidency of the Central Bank: Federico Sturzenegger, PhD in economics from the prestigious MIT in the USA, professor at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) and at the John F School of Government. Kennedy of Harvard. In 2006 at the Davos Economic Forum in Switzerland Sturzenegger was awarded Young Global Leader.
Some analysts say that economic policy neoliberal crisis of Macri failed by the gradual implementation of spending cuts and the lack of privatizations. âGradualismâ is pointed out as the main factor for the currency crisis, increase in domestic and foreign public debt. please note that the economic results of its first two years were not bad. THE economic debacle was just after September 2018, when Macri recognized for the first time that the country is going through a severe crisis of confidence and recognized the shortcomings of its long-term cut strategy.[5] Therefore, some analysts maintain that the surprising and resounding failure was due to the change sharp after the mid-term elections, when the gradualism of the first two years was replaced by a more radical method in an immediate search for results. According to the ex-president of the Central Bank, Federico Stuzenegger, The objective of gradualism was to make a smooth transition without social shocks until at least the mid-term elections, he maintains that during the first year Macri avoided shock treatment in public accounts fearing consequences suffered by ex-president Fernando De la RĂșa in 2001. The severe cuts in public spending implemented by the De La economic team Ended up deteriorating further the economic situation, thus causing an enormous political and social crisis that culminated in the resignation of the presidency and a cinematic escape from board a helicopter in an improvised way on the roof of Casa Rosada to avoid demonstrations at Plaza de Mayo in 20 December 2001.
The interpretation of these journalistic and experts corroborates the historical understanding that in South America the implementation of neoliberal policies has a high electoral cost. In the decade of 90 several countries in the region had adopted âstructural reformsâ recommended in the summary written in 1989 by English economist John Williamson and known for Washington Consensus. These neoliberal reforms culminated in privatization of state assets, squeeze of public spending, trade and financial liberalization. All these governments fell into the polls because of poor economic results. THE Argentina in particular experienced a unique case when becoming champion of reforms neoliberals of the years 90 to total and absolute political chaos, economic and social December 2001. Just under a year later, No brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was also victimized by the polls in part by the economic crisis that the parents crossed. With the exception of Colombia, all South American governments that following the Washington Consensus suffered electoral defeats in the first decade of the century 21. This turn to the left became known as the âpink tideâ (or pink tide in English) nomenclature created by American journalist Larry Rohter.
Mauricio Macri's surprising election for presidency of the Argentine Republic in 2015 marked the beginning of the ebb of this âtide pink". In the years that followed Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, in 2016, the return of Sebastian Piñera to the Palacio de la Moneda in 2017 and finally Jair Bolsonaro elected in 2018. Mauricio Macri represented the opens the door to a political movement that predicts better budget management through tax reform and control over public spending, control over the harmful practices of corruption and decrease in the size of the state. However in 26 last October the then Argentine president was the most recent to fall for adopting neoliberal policies, sinking in your reelection attempt.
Without going into the merit of the real value of policies neoliberal economics, but in view of the experts' analysis of The reasons for Macri's defeat in the last elections, as well as the history of last 30 years in the region, the hypothesis is accepted that economic policies neoliberals provide electoral wear and tear - perhaps purely and simply because not result in concrete economic improvements within the cycle time electoral. Finally, it is worth remembering that in the last four decades Argentina and Brazil went through waves of political renewals together: redemocratization of the years 80, implementation of neoliberal reforms in 90 followed by rise of progressive governments in 2000 and movement return conservative-reformist from 2015. There is no reason to suppose that this political harmony between the two nations has been interrupted.
Assuming the wear hypothesis as valid electoral system that neoliberal policies represent to governors, this article presents other particularities of this recent Argentine case to contribute to a better understanding of the current Brazilian situation and evaluation of forecasts for the current government.
Macri's case is paradigmatic for three reasons: fur history and consistency of his political project, for their family ties and for the international support it received. To do so follows a brief profile of Mauricio Macri, from his rise as a politician to his fall in 26 of October. The reason for understanding the political figure of Mauricio Macri and his trajectory until the presidency sheds light on the extreme fragility of the current government and, about everything, of improvisation, opportunism and demagogy of the ânew national rightâ that took the Assault Brazil. Mauricio Macri's experience in Argentina demonstrates the enormous difficulty that an ideological transition of power represents together with voting population. Another difference that stands out is the erratic foreign policy of our current federal government based on superficial personal ties and a little pragmatic speech that borders on the conspiracy. The rise and fall of Macri present themselves as a real measure for comparison, revealing the many failures of the current Brazilian government as well as the degree of improvisation of its Brazilian political âmovementâ, and difficulties in implementing a neoliberal economic agenda.
A gradual and organic political construction.
Unlike the Brazilian case, in which a movement of center-right politicians took place almost spontaneously or opportunistically, the argentine case of the foundation Mauricio Macri's PRO party represents a project that started almost 20 years. His strategy went well structured and executed until the last day 27 October when it bittered its greatest and most surprising defeat. Since 2001 Macri surrounded himself with a large group formed by renowned businessmen and scholars in public policies.
It was at the dawn of the century 21, at the time of the most serious political, economic and social crisis that Argentina has experienced that Mauricio Macri began his political construction. In 2001 Mauricio Macri, next to your then partner, the businessman Francisco De Narvaez, created the foundation Believe and Grow [Believe and Grow] for the elaboration of studies and public policy proposals for the city of Buenos Aires and for the country. While De Narvaez was responsible for coordinating the national scope, MaurĂcio Macri directed the studies related to the city of Buenos Aires. Were invited businessmen and specialists in public policies to manage the foundation and to coordinate the studies and proposals that were carried out by renowned academics. While the central core of coordinators and administrators Foundation Believe and Grow it was formed by 40 people, the extended network of academics and experts came to more of 250 people already in 2002.[6] A good part of these collaborators who are together with him from the beginning still remain in his political project until today. Many were elected to public office by the party founded by Macri or allied parties, others so many assumed executive positions as secretaries and ministers around the city and Buenos Aires province and national government - such as the current mayor of Buenos Aires Horacio Rodriguez Larreta, of the chief of minister Marcos Peña and Health Minister Carolina Stanley who held executive positions both in the city hall of Buenos Aires and the national government.
With its team of experts formed, Macri created a new political party âCompromisso para el Cambioâ [Commitment to change], which would later be called the Republican Proposal, or PRO. The party recruited its foundation staff Believe and Grow and of the business environment, of NGOs, think tanks and dissident politicians from other parties. Even without attaching itself to a explicit ideological orientation, party guidelines were based on liberal-conservative political values ââand in market economy or neoliberal. Avoiding the confrontation between the right and left and Peronism and the anti-peronism, Mauricio Macri presented himself as a new alternative to the âOld politicsâ which made it possible for Peronist voters and anti-Peronists to your proposal. Coherent with your responsibilities at the Foundation, Macri started his political journey looking for the city hall of Buenos Aires. Macri also took advantage of his popularity for have been between 1995 e 2007 outstanding president of Boca football club Juniors with countless achievements on the pitch.
Macri's electoral debut in 2003 It was considered a success. Disputing the city hall of Buenos Aires, Macri finished the first shift first. But, was defeated by AnĂbal Ibarra in the second round. His robust political proposal has given results in the legislature. With 25 candidates elected, the political slate headed by Macri has consolidated itself as the main strength in the legislative chamber of Buenos Aires and opposition to the government of Ibarra. In 2005, Macri would come to be elected federal deputy for the province of Buenos Aires. Your PRO party elected eight other federal deputies, but no senator. In 2007 Macri was elected mayor of Buenos Aires Aires with 45% of the valid votes in the first round and 61% no second shift. He was re-elected to the position in 2011 also in the second round with 64% of valid votes.
With moderate center-right speech and plans of objective governments, Mauricio Macri became president of the Republic in 2015 when conquering 51% no second round valid votes against Daniel Scioli (candidate of the Government and then governor of the province of Buenos Aires). Also in the elections of 2015 his party snapped up the Government of Buenos Aires and the city hall of the City of Buenos Aires - unprecedented feat for an Argentine political party. Non-legislative, the PRO occupied 47 the 257 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 9 the 27 senate vacancies. Macri's victory in the elections of 2015 humiliated the Kirchnerism.
Family Macri. Ties in Argentina and the World
Macri does part of a family with deep ties to the Argentine business elite and International. Your father, Franco Macri (1930-2019) was an authentic representative of the world business elite. Throughout his life Franco has invested throughout Latin America, developed solid business relationships with the state Chinese bureaucratic business, has been involved in millionaire real estate deals with Donald Trump and cultivated deep ties with the European aristocracy. although of the corruption scandals and money laundering complaints, Franco's empire provided Macri with the privileged access to the restricted circle of business and local and global power.
Franco Macri (1930-2019), born in Rome the son of a aristocrat from Calabria and a Roman heiress to public transport companies in the Lazio region, arrived in Buenos Aires at 18 years old. Soon married with the daughter of a landowner in the city of Tandil, southern region of the province of Buenos Aires known for its fertile lands. Over the decades Franco constituted a huge economic conglomerate known as Socma (Society Macri). Its main business activities were in civil construction - bridges, pipelines, buildings, roads, factories, electrification - but also acted with prominence in the agroindustry, real estate market, natural gas, hospitality, mining, garbage collection, executive aircraft rental, production cinematographic, auto parts production, retails. Your investments are not limited only to Argentina, reaching bordering countries like Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile and also reaching the United States, Belgium, Italy and even China. In the decade of 90 Franco Macri started to develop business relations with the Chinese government from the CITIC Group (China International Trust and Investment Corporation). In 2005 founded the SHIMA company to invest in soybean fields and soybean oil processing in partnership with the Chinese Sanhe Hopefull Grain and Oil. Since 2006 Franco Macri serves as âsenior advisor for investments in Latin America âfor the People's Republic of China, offering his advice to the executives of the National Development Bank of China and the Chinese Central Bank.[7] Mariano macri, one of his children and Mauricio's brother, was the mayor -China Trade Agreement.
Mauricio Macri's first steps in politics have already demonstrated the value of their vast and deep ties to the global elite. In 2002 when Argentina was going through its worst economic crisis, thanks to your Macri contacts proved useful to the Argentine government. As an unofficial negotiator, Macri met with leaders of Spanish Prime Minister JosĂ© MarĂa Aznar and executives from major Spanish multinationals like Repsol, Phone, Bank Bilbao Vizcaya, Endesa and others. On his return to Buenos Aires, Macri took the government positions and Spanish executives to then President Eduardo Duhalde. It was as an intermediary between foreign investors and the Argentine government that Macri took his first steps in politics and thus built his first alliances.[8]
It is not surprising that as president of the republic Macri has managed to receive so many privileges from the international community: massive support from international financial banking in issuing bonds public, deepening of agreements with the Chinese government, statements of support of the Spanish Monarchy, the right and privilege to organize the G20 meeting in Buenos Aires in November last year. Finally, Macri can complete the Mercosur-European Union agreement announced in July 2019 and receive formalization United States' support for Argentina's entry into the OECD - two favorable elements for his re-election attempt.[9] It is exceptional events like these that give the exact measure for the tremendous economic-electoral failure.
International financial intuitions were the first to support the Macri government. In April 2016, after almost 15 years out of the capital markets, Argentina issued 16,5 billions of dollars of public debt securities - the largest issuance ever made by an emerging country. [10] The total offered by investors came close to 70 billions of dollars, indicating confidence vote in the economic policy of the Macri government. Of the 16,5 billion of dollars issued the government used 9,3 billions to pay creditors of titles in default since 2004. THE back to the markets, despite being criticized by many, put an end to the years of moratorium and conflict with holdouts â funds vultures holding unstructured bonds.[11] In June 2018 Macri announced that Argentina would receive from the Monetary Fund International a loan of 57 billions of dollars - the loan may already granted by the multilateral body.[12] Regardless of the criticisms that these loans can and should receive, The fact highlighted here is the ability of Macri to articulate to receive support internationally.
Another outstanding element was Macri's role in Mercosur-European Union agreement. Unlike what the government has touted Brazilian and reported by the press in Brazil, the agreement between the blocks regional operations was the result of Macri's efforts to resume negotiations still in 2015 and completed in 2019. Without going into the merit of advantages or disadvantages of the agreement for Mercosur, it is undeniable that the conclusion of the negotiations it was thanks to the harmony and effort between the Argentine government, governments of Spain and France and Commissioners from the European Commission. On the side of Mercosur, at negotiations were led by Argentine Chancellor Jorge Faurie and his team formed by the Minister of Production and Labor Dante Sica, Secretariat of Commerce Abroad Marisa Bircher and Secretary of Economic Relations Horåcio Reyser. U.S backstage of diplomacy it is known that in the first meeting between the presidents, in 16 de Janeiro it was Macri who convinced Bolsonaro about the importance of Mercosur and mainly of the agreement and advantages of the negotiation in course with the European Union. To have Brazilian adhesion in this negotiation carried out by Macri was the only reason for his approach to Bolsonaro. The announcement official agreement was made by the crack formed by the Trade Commissioner Outside the European Union Cecilia Malmström, his fellow Agriculture Commissioner Phil Hogan and Chancellor Argentine Faurie.[13] In video published by AFP news agency, of a cell phone shoot done at the end of the meeting that sealed the deal, clearly shows the Chancellor Faurie as the main figure being greeted and celebrated by negotiators Europeans.[14] The fact is that the Mercosur-European Union agreement was yet another breakthrough Macri with his international allies, culminating the day before the start of your campaign for reelection.
Conclusions
In Brazil, majority of new political actors associated with the flaming ânew national rightâ has grown by feeding on the political-economic crises that have been plaguing the country since 2016 and the diffuse feeling associated with anti-corruption and anti-corruption agendas. antipetism. With the exception of the New Party project, the current actors politicians of the supposedly conservative liberal right are umbilically linked specific narratives about recent historical events - the PetrolĂŁo, The Operation Car Wash, the impeachment, among others. Most of these actors emerging politicians - such as the figures associated with the MBL and those towed by the Bolsonaro phenomenon - have been showing embarrassing day after day demonstrations of opportunism, demagogy, political inexperience while surviving as true parasites of crises. Another anomaly of the current policy Brazilian partisanship is the attempt to seize parties already established by inexperienced leaders - as in the case of PSL and PSDB - and the unprecedented feat of abandonment of the party and the creation of a new one by a president of the republic in course of his term. Paulo Guedes is also a typical political adventurer who foresaw the possibility of Bolsonaro's electoral success, but not has notoriety among the international community, nor recognition by the national or international academic community.
Unlike the current political frameworks on the right Brazilian, Mauricio Macri made a solid rise to the top of politics Argentina based on a well-designed strategy and gradually implemented with solid business and institutional ties in the country and in the world. The PRO party has an institutionally sound political base with organic growth and continued. Its network of employees goes back to the crisis of 2001 and offered the Macri trained and faithful allies of different shades of the thinking society Argentina: academy members, of the business and political environment. Your government also counted on proposals and public policies elaborated more than a decade with medium and long term vision. Macri came to the presidency with the experience of one term as national legislator and two consecutive terms in the executive of the most populous and richest city in the country. Another differential was its close business and friendship ties with the world elite provided by his father throughout his life, but not even the aspects presented were sufficient to guarantee the continuity of his government.
Another factor to consider is that in Argentina the right is very much associated and stigmatized with authoritarian governments among 1976 e 1983. In addition, only 20% of the Argentine electorate is classified as being right-wing. For these reasons Macri has always shied away from the right-wing label or center-right, recognizing only its pro-market and liberal orientation. That is a stark difference with the Bolsonaro government that is proud of its antagonism with any and all progressive value.
The only real similarity between the Macri and Bolsonaro finds himself precisely in neoliberal economic policies, although of their method differences. While Paulo Guedes opts for the scorching therapy shock - practiced in Chile in 1975, in Bolivia in 1985, and in the former republics soviet years 90 - Mauricio Macri's team proposed a strategy gradual reduction in public spending and inflation. Another difference that begins to surface is the fact that since the beginning of his Macri government counted on the unconditional support of international banking, of the American government - with Obama and Trump - and the Monetary Fund International. In this sense, the current Brazilian government boasted an alleged support from international leaders, which has at times been only superficial - in the case of the Trump administration exemplified by the âsupportâ of Brazil's entry into the OECD - or purely irrelevant - as the Israeli government's initial support of Benjamin Netanyahu who recently ended up defeated at the polls. The same can be say of announcements about the advances in the international scope and in the attraction of investments foreigners who reveal themselves only as artificial narratives - like the agreement Mercosur-European Union and the ill-fated pre-salt auction. The result of shock policy of the current Brazilian government is showing its first signs of failure with foreign investors. The latest forecasts point out that 2019 will set the historic record for capital outflows.[15]
It is also worth mentioning that the Macri case marked the second defeat of governments held by conservatives and neoliberals in Latin America in just over a year. In July 2018 Manuel LĂłpez Obrador defeated Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico and became the first elected left-wing president in the country. It is worth mentioning that Mexico had been one of the few Latin countries Americans to stay out of the advance of progressive governments in the region. Would be signs that there is a hangover from the âpink tideâ?
For presenting a project diametrically opposed to
current Brazilian political movement, Mauricio Macri's defeat wide open the
helplessness of our current government. Even a government with a high level of
party organization, with a team made up of faithful experts and with
broad and solid international support sank in the polls due to the poor results of
its neoliberal economic policy. If we take the recent experience lived in
Argentina, there are strong factual indications that point to economic failure,
political and electoral system of the current Brazilian government. In our case, there is still
observe that improvisation and political fragility are not used
as justifications for a possible institutional rupture in order to complete
the implementation of the âmodernizingâ agenda of neoliberal reforms.
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Grades
[1] Local press articles
Macri wasted ” the opportunity of the century”, Walter Graziano, 15 from November 2019, Buenos Aires: Financial sphere. https://www.ambito.com/macri-desperdicio-la-oportunidad-del-siglo-n5065845
The diaries of world echo the poverty in Argentina and talk about the failure of Macri, 1 of October 2019, Buenos Aires: The chronicler https://www.cronista.com/internacionales/Los-diarios-del-mundo-se-hacen-eco-de-la-pobreza-en-Argentina-y-hablan-del–failure-of-Macri-20191001-0004.html
“The perception now is that Macri is an idiot”, 15 of October 2019, good Aires: Page 12 https://www.pagina12.com.ar/225410-es-el-modelo-estupido
"First five lessons of the primaries Argentines ", Maristella Mushrooms, August 2019.Opinion, Buenos Aires: New Society Magazine. https://nuso.org/articulo/argentina-elecciones-lecciones-clivajes-peronismo-macrismo/
Articles from the international press
The anti-neoliberal wave rocking Latin America, Ishaan Tharoor, 29 of October 2019, Washington Post.
The resurrection of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, Ricardo Kirschbaum, 22 of October 2019, Foreign Affairs.
Argentinaâs economic woes spell doom for Macriâs election prospects, Michael Stott e Benedict Mander, 13 of October 2019, Mendoza: Financial Times
Poverty, priests and politics: why Peronism is back in Argentina,
Benedict Mander, 10 in October 2019. Buenos Aires: Financial Times Magazine Life & Artshttps://www.ft.com/content/bb85da28-ea27-11e9-85f4-d00e5018f061
Stiglitz
on Argentina: âNeoliberal experiment has failedâ, 21 of September 2019, https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/stiglitz-about-argentina-neoliberal-experiment-has-failed-spectacularly-20190921-0013.html
Argentinaâs Economic Misery Could Bring Populism Back to the Country, Peter S. Goodman, 10 of May 2019, New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/business/argentina-economy-macri-populism.html
[2] "The economic failure of Macri is surprising", Federico Sturzenegger, 31 in October, Buenos Aires: Infobae.
[3] Elections in Argentina: what economy Macri inherited and how is it now, Cristina J. Orgaz, 27 of October 2019, BBC World News. https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/internacional-50189189
[4] "Macri's economic policy failed from day one", it says former Argentine Economy Minister, Enric GonzĂĄlez interview Roberto Lavagna, 1 of August 2019, Buenos Aires: The country. https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/07/31/internacional/1564592579_093807.html
In September capital flight was triggered and in the Macri era of the country US $ 84,100 million, 22 of October 2019, Buenos Aires: Minutouno.com
[5] Macri's speech: the President sought to ward off his own ghosts and shake the strangers, Eduardo Paladini, 3 of September 2018. Buenos Aires: Clarin.
[6] The Paganini Foundation, José Natanson, 22 of September 2002, Buenos Aires: Page 12
[7] The Chinese government appointed Franco Macri investment advisor, 26 of May 2006, Buenos Aires: Infobae
[8] Macri, with Duhalde, 14 of June 2002, good Aires: Clarion
[9] âU.S. backs Brazil for OECD membership, but Argentina first”, Marcela Ayres, 10 of October 2019, Brasilia: Reuters
[10] Argentina returns to global debt markets after 15-years, Hugh Bronstein, Sarah Marsh, 19 of April 2016. Buenos Aires: Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-bonds-bids/argentina-returns-to-global-debt-markets-after-15-years-idUSKCN0XG2W0
[11] Argentina says #CiaoDefault, paying holdouts after 14 years, Brad Haynes e Hugh Bronstein, 22 of April 2016. good Aires: Reuters.
[12] Argentina gets biggest loan in IMFâs history at $57bn, Uki Goñi, 27 of September 2018, London: The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/26/argentina-imf-biggest-loan
[13] Belgium: EU and Mercosur herald massive new trade deal, 28 of June 2019, Ruptly.
[14] Leaders cheers after EU, S. America bloc reach trade deal, 28 of June 2019, AFP News Agency.
[15] Dollars outflow is already greater than volume of 1999, worst year of the series. Marcelo Osakabe and Lucas Hirata, 18 from November 2019, Sao Paulo: Economic value https://valor.globo.com/financas/noticia/2019/11/18/saida-de-dolares-ja-e-maior-que-volume-de-1999-pior-ano-da-serie.ghtml
